The article by Reutlinger beginning on page 50 reviews the evolution of the World Bank's experience with policies to eliminate poverty through development and its current view of the effect of adjustment policies on the welfare of the poor. There were originally expectations that the benefits of development would trickle down to the poor and more recently that development policies could be designed to benefit the poor more directly. The assertion is made that the effects of structural adjustment operations that result in food price increases can be offset by other measures supported by the Bank that will mitigate the consequences and help the poor to weather structural adjustments.
As other articles in this special issue indicate, however, the problem is that the adjustment policies result in higher prices for food and lower real wages, while formidable administrative obstacles usually block the implementation of measures to moderate their effects on the poor. The examples cited by Reutlinger do not provide convincing evidence to the contrary, although they indicate a significant effort.
The statements by the Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMP) on page 87 suggest that the IMP would be responsive to innovative proposals to effect economic adjustment policies without worsening poverty or malnutrition. Nevertheless, discussion at the March 1987 meeting of the ACC Sub-committee on Nutrition revealed that no such country proposals have yet been made.
Letters to the editor or articles are invited that can document the actual nutritional and health consequences, either positive or negative, of economic adjustment policies supported by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. -N.S.
Macroeconomic adjustment policies and income distribution: the macroeconomic relationships CRISES AND STABILIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
A typical developing country faces balance-of-payments difficulties, accelerating inflation, high food prices, corruption and mismanagement of public enterprises, speculation in the private sector, destabilizing demands for wage increases by workers, and a visible increase of poverty. Often political tension and racial strife make domestic resolutions of conflict difficult. This is compounded by sudden reluctance on the part of foreign commercial banks to increase their lending as well as strings attached to bilateral loans and political pressures exerted by the superpowers.
Under such difficult circumstances, governments are required to take strong measures to stabilize the economy externally and internally. These policy measures imply hard political and economic choices. Stabilization policies come as a package, and the sum of their effects over time and the dynamic path of the adjustments have to be monitored at every step.
Several issues must be considered by policymakers before the measures are implemented. Is a shock treatment preferable to gradualism? What is the appropriate timing to introduce specific measures so that they do not have effects that cancel each other out or make the situation worse than before the shock? Finally, what consideration should be given to the welfare of specific population groups, in the form of measures counteracting the adverse impact of the adjustments on these groups?
Stabilization policies in developing countries are applied when there is an imbalance between aggregate income and aggregate expenditures in the economy, as reflected in the deficit of the current account of the balance of payments. The total amount of income generated by factors of production in the economy or borrowed abroad is not sufficient to cover the expenditures incurred.
The country enters a crisis when the relationship between income and expenditures is not viable in the short run, in the sense that it cannot secure funds from abroad to finance the gap between expenditures and revenues. Whether the relationship between income and expenditure is viable at the economy-wide level therefore depends essentially on the level of foreign reserves and of foreign financing (i.e., credits and grants from abroad) available to the country.
Basic identities from national income accounts are sufficient to provide a framework of explanation. The value of output produced in the country, called gross national product, is distributed to various income recipients according to a changing pattern of income distribution. Income is received primarily in the form of wage income to urban workers, employees, farm labourers, etc.; income of small proprietors such as farmers, artisans, pedlars, and operators of small enterprises; profits to medium-size or large firms; interest paid to banks on loans; profit margins accruing to intermediaries, for example, for the import of materials imported from abroad; and taxes paid to the government. The changes in income distribution depend fundamentally on income shares and on changes in prices.
In national accounts, expenditures are classified into four broad macroeconomic aggregates: private consumption, public consumption (government current expenditures), investment, and the trade balanceexports minus imports. For the national income to equal the gross national product, only the net balance between exports and imports is to be considered, since exports represent revenues, while imports represent expenditures. Aggregate domestic expenditures are called absorption, a term including private and public consumption and investment, and meaning the total amount of real resources absorbed in the economy.
Expenditures are made on goods and services for direct use (consumer goods and intermediate goods) or for investment purposes. Investment is financed by savings, which originate from three major sources. The "savings-investment identity'' from the national accounts identifies these sources as private sector saving (income of the private sector, net of taxes, minus consumption); government saving (revenues, including taxes, less expenditures), which of course will be a deficit if public expenditures exceed revenues; and foreign saving, that is, the trade-balance deficit. An excess of imports over exports represents an inflow of capital since the country spends more than it receives, and the rest of the world makes up the difference. Viewing this equality in another way it is easy to see, for example, that the government budget deficit, as a matter of accounting, must be equal to an excess of investment over saving by the private sector (for example, in the form of financial claims on the public sector) plus an excess of imports over exports (trade-balance deficit).
In a very theoretical sense, a macroeconomic crisis implies a disequilibrium between incomes and expenditures, and therefore a change so severe that it threatens to undermine the stability of variables hitherto regarded as constants in the economic system, such as institutional structure and institutional arrangements [1] . Economists view the economy of a country as an equilibrium system -that is, an aggregation of various institutions (firms, consumers, government, etc.) united by regular interaction according to mechanisms of control, where prices (commodity prices, wages, etc.) and quantities (level of output, employment, etc.) are the adjusting variables that maintain equilibrium in the system. The mechanisms of control for the short run, or stabilization mechanisms, are either automatic (such as the price mechanism when markets work without outside intervention), legislated (as is the case in certain economies of income, and therefore of demand, when a recession sets in), or regulated by policymakers inside the country and abroad in a series of coordinated shortterm decisions, called stabilization policies.
A normally functioning economy is constantly subjected to small disequilibria due to "shocks" but is stable enough to withstand those shocks, the effects of which are corrected by mechanisms of control built into the system. By contrast, when there is a crisis, the threat of impending collapse and of a breakdown in the system requires strong policy measures. A breakdown can come about because certain boundary conditions are reached in the system. The country is then faced with a structural crisis, for example, because its debt-service ratio has reached critical proportions and requires that structural adjustments take place. The debt-service ratio is the ratio of interest payments on loans contracted by the country to gross domestic product (GDP). A ratio of 30 per cent is considered in most cases to be a critical value. The GDP measures the total value of goods and services produced in the economy, and is equal to absorption plus net exports (that is, exports minus imports). By contrast, GNP (gross national product) measures the total value of income accruing to residents in the economy. If there were no trade, GNP and GDP would be equal since income would have no one to accrue to but domestic residents.
Typical structural adjustments advocated presently by international agencies such as the World Bank include providing incentives to exporters in order to generate foreign exchange to repay the debt and avoid defaulting.
A breakdown can also come about because stabilization mechanisms are such that the equilibrium of the system is not stable anymore. Instability can be the consequence of market mechanisms (for instance, in a poor agrarian country when a bad harvest leads to shortages and high prices), or it can be brought about by mismanagement (for example, excessive military spending or unproductive prestige projects of the government financed by simply borrowing from the central bank), by political tensions leading to capital flight out of the country, or by excessive wage claims by the urban working class fueling inflation. Instability can also result from exogenous shocks to the economy that are too strong for the usual corrective measures, for example, unpredictable fluctuations in the international commodity prices.
During the past decade, developing countries have been subjected to very severe external shocks. Increases in oil prices and in grain prices, world-wide inflation, high interest rates, floating exchange rates, low and unstable prices for all export commodities [2] , and the interruption or reduction of commercial borrowing have put an unprecedented strain on most developing economies. The recession experienced by those economies since 1979 is the most severe since the Second World War. Average growth rates of output have been minuscule during 1979-1983. The performance was particularly bleak in 1983, above all in Africa and Latin America [3] .
The impact of the deterioration in the terms of trade, of the reduced foreign demand for exports, and of international interest rate increases will be felt in the short run and in the long run. External shocks directly affect national income by reducing demand, both demand for exports and domestic demand, and indirectly by reducing output below the capacity of the economy to produce because it is dependent on imported inputs for the purchase of which no foreign exchange is available.
"Normal" corrective measures therefore require foreign financing, and commercial banks are now reluctant to increase their lending to developing countries. There are some mechanisms in the international economy that enable governments to bridge the gap temporarily, but no internationally agreed-upon mechanism considers the case of permanent balance-of-payments difficulties. In this case, only painful adjustments can solve the problem [4] . Symptomatically enough, in the North-South world system, international mechanisms always require the countries suffering from balance-of-payments deficits to operate the adjustments in their economies. The deficit of the South has its counterpart in the surplus of the North. In industrialized countries, which enjoy much higher standards of living, adjustments would be much less painful than in developing nations.
The intervention of international lending agencies is predicated on whether the shock is of a temporary or of a permanent nature. If the shock resulting in balanceof-payments difficulties is temporary, so that sufficient external resources make it possible to keep both real consumption and real investment at their pre-shock level, there is traditionally a case for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to make those resources available to the country until the situation reverses itself. If the shock permanently affects the terms on which the country interacts with the international economy, there is no presumption that finance will be automatically made available to ease the effects of these shocks. There are resources on which countries in difficulty can lay claim, for instance at the IMF [5] , but the rule here is not automaticity but conditionality. The approval of the loan is made conditional upon the acceptance by the country of a stabilization programme to operate adjustments in the domestic economy, negotiated between the IMF staff and the economic policy team of the country, called a stand-by agreement.
Adjustments are required if previous projections concerning consumption, investment, and income level are to be realized in the medium to long run.
The IMF has acquired a crucial role in developing countries not so much because of the actual amount of assistance involved but because of the conditions attached to it. Therefore its analytical approach and doctrine have acquired a particular significance. The traditional assumption is that a Fund programme will underpin the country's creditworthiness [6] and encourage commercial banks and governments of industrialized countries to lend additional funds to the country. Even when the Fund is not involved in the measures, developing countries' policy-makers usually adopt policies that would have obtained its approval [5] or try to obtain its tacit support.
The policies advocated by the Fund (and by other representatives of orthodoxy) are strongly monetarist. Fund economists rarely diverge from the monetarist model when negotiating an agreement with local policymakers or during their "financial programming" incountry exercises.
A financial programme, in the jargon of the IMF, is a set of coordinated policy measures in the monetary, fiscal, and balance-of-payments fields intended to achieve specific targets -that is, levels of macroeconomic variables -during the period of the stand-by agreement, generally one or two years. The task of setting targets, choosing policy instruments, and quantifying the appropriate magnitude of the instruments required to reach the targets is described as financial programming [7] . The underlying approach on which Fund economists base their programming is the monetary approach to the balance of payments, which since the mid 1960s has become the official doctrine of the IMF [8] . The Fund concentrates on a small number of "performance criteria" on which the successive disbursement of socalled upper credit tranches are made conditional, with overriding consideration given to the achievement of external balance. The conditions have evolved over the years [9, 10] but of late have always concentrated on a few policy prescriptions that follow logically from the monetarist model. These policies are described in the next section.
STABILIZATION POLICIES AND THEIR DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES
[Monetarist policy is] simply a campaign against the standard of life of the working classes [operating through] the deliberate intensification of unemployment . . . by using the weapon of economic necessity against individuals and against particular industries. [11] Stabilization policies are neither distributionally nor politically neutral. Policy-makers always have at their disposal a vast array of instruments with which they can achieve the twin goals of restoring internal and external balance. On analytical grounds, there is nothing that justifies that one particular policy package be adopted. Rather, it is a matter of political choices and, ultimately, of the kind of society one wishes to live in: low growth but a high degree of welfare for the majority and fairly democratic institutions, or high growth rates, sharp income inequalities, and an authoritarian regime to maintain order.
The politics of stabilization is a tricky business, brilliantly described in recent papers 112, 13]. The same policy measure can give rise to quite different responses, depending on the country. Tinkering with food prices by cutting food subsidies gave rise to immediate and massive food riots in Egypt in January 1977, to widespread disturbances five months after the measures had been adopted in Morocco in January 1984, and to virtually no protest in Senegal in early 1982 and in August 1983, or in Madagascar in May 1982 and mid-1983 [14] . In Sri Lanka, where the food subsidy system was substantially transformed in 1977 in the wake of the change of government, there was no noticeable public response, but it is possible that the racial conflicts that surfaced in the 1980s are related to the distributional impact of the changes.
Depending (a) on the nature of the external shocks, (b) on the characteristics of the particular economy, and (c) on the policy response of the government, the consequences of stabilization policies can be extremely diverse. In any case they will entail social costs, in the present or in the future. Either consumption in real terms or savings in real terms, or some combination of both, must fall. Adjustments can be postponed, but their necessity is likely to surface sooner or later. A reduction in the savings rate leads to reduced growth rates of output and of national income in the future. Real investment can only be sustained if domestic savings increase or if increased external resources are available to the country, but the latter has not been the case in the first half of the 1980s. During the 1970s, some countries, such as Peru, Jamaica, and Tanzania, used external financial resources made available to them to avoid (or minimize) decreases in per capita consumption. Other countries, such as Singapore and Taiwan, accepted a temporary decline in real growth and used foreign resources in productive investment. Finally, an intermediate group of countries, including Brazil, Turkey, Portugal, Mexico, and Yugoslavia, used foreign loans to maintain the rate of growth of domestic consumption and also to channel resources into import-substituting activities [5] .
Components of Orthodox Stabilization Packages
An orthodox policy package of the type advocated by the IMP will contain some or all of the following policy measures: 1. Credit is restricted through the imposition of separate ceilings on credit from the domestic banking system to the private sector and the government (including public enterprises), leading to monetary contraction. 2. Specific targets for the public-sector deficit usually back up such measures, sometimes with agreements about which programmes are to be cut or which revenue sources are to be increased so that the deficit targets can be attained. 3. Government intervention in the price system is reduced or abolished, and in particular consumer food subsidies are eliminated [10] . 4. Price liberalization is often accompanied by measures meant to contain cost increases. Freezing of wage demands is often recommended to cut inflationary pressures and "perhaps shift the income distribution toward high-saving profit recipients and the upper middle class" [15] .
5. The currency is depreciated; either through explicit devaluation or through equivalent measures such as cuts in quotas, higher prior deposits for imports, subsidies for exports, etc., which lead to a depreciation of the effective exchange rate. Depending on the country's specific circumstances, the devaluation may be gradual over time in a series of mini-devaluations or once and for all in a maxidevaluation. In the case of some countries, such as the southern-cone countries of Latin America, the Fund has pressed to slow the rate at which the domestic currency is devalued over time in a crawling peg, because the slower crawl is supposed to dampen expectations and be anti-inflationary. 6. Finally, internal and external liberalization -by the removal of restrictions on external trade or capital movements, or on internal prices and transactions --usually accompanies the set of measures described above. Internal financial reform and liberalization are often achieved through increases in interest rates. External liberalization is achieved through reduction in trade barriers and impediments to the free flow of capital. These policies, starting from an unsustainable level of absorption, are based on a reduction in real consumption and/or investment relative to income. They are also meant to have '' expenditure-switching" effects, by means of reorienting production towards tradables and away from non-tradables. No policy, including orthodox policies, can be said to be distributionally neutral in the sense of leaving the distribution of income between factors of production, between sectors, or between households unchanged after the policy is applied. These policies will affect the income and the welfare of the poor through changes in prices, changes in their entitlements, and changes in employment.
Once it is established that stabilization policies do affect the distribution of income, it is necessary to find out which groups are likely to gain and to lose. The burden of adjustment will not be borne equally by all social groups and by all industries. Are the poor the most hurt by such policies, or is it the middle classes? Will those gains and losses be felt immediately or with a time lag?
Monetarists and Structuralists
A debate over stabilization policies in developing countries that has been raging for more than a decade has set followers against critics of orthodoxy. The debate is centred around three major issues: (a) the appropriate model to analyse adjustments in developing countries, and in particular which variables are left out of the model, and the manner in which adjustments operate; (b) the empirical evidence concerning the variables of the models, for example, whether output and employment in specific sectors respond to higher prices and wages; and (c) the issue of the social cost of the policies.
At the risk of oversimplifying the debate on stabilization policies, from the point of view of their distributional consequences, the sharpest contrast is between monetarists and structuralists. Neither camp is a homogeneous bloc.
Monetarists range from the pragmatic economists of the IMP to the dogmatic academics of the University of Chicago. Their critics include mainstream Keynesians, leftist politicians, and structuralist economists. Structuralism originated in Latin America when some economists at the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL) of the United Nations worked out an alternative framework to the dominant current of thought in economics in the 1950s. Today, the theory has been formalized in rigorous models and refined to take account of the major changes in the world economy. Structuralism has a strong Keynesian heritage but places emphasis on the specificity of the economic structure of developing countries as contrasted to that of more developed nations.
Monetarists view adverse distributional changes of stabilization policies as merely a by-product of unavoidable austerity policies. They put emphasis in their analysis of the causes of the crisis on past policies that are overly expansionary, and therefore recommend demand management policies, mainly through the use of monetary instruments. To avoid drastic changes in the distribution of income during the stabilization period, they recommend corrective measures.
Structuralists, by contrast, consider that orthodox stabilization policies are essentially stag inflationary and work precisely because of the changes that occur in the distribution of income as a result of forced savings and of relative price changes.
Some authors disagree with the statement that structuralism represents an alternative to orthodox stabilization policies. In a recent paper, it was argued that "structuralist/populist" policies -as the authors call them -address long-term issues of development such as the removal of supply bottlenecks and do not have a coherent approach to short-term economic management [16] . The Chilean experience of 1970-1973 and the Argentine experience of 1973-1976 are cited as examples of structuralist/populist policies and are identified with expansionary policies that soon result in undesired inflation. The conclusion is that "the debate about leastcost methods of short-run adjustment is not one between orthodoxy and structuralism but rather concerns the range of options within orthodoxy. " This assessment is based on a partial judgement of structuralism, that considers only the policies advocated by R. Prebisch and CEPAL during the 1960s. It disregards the recent works of the "neo-structuralist" authors [15] who are very much concerned about the short run and have worked out a fairly elaborate critique of orthodoxy, although by their own admission "progressive economists have not been much more coherent [than orthodox ones] in their judgment about possible effects of redistribution" [15] .
Consequences of Stabilization Policies for the Poor
As scandalous an omission as it may seem, given the importance of the topic, economists know very little about the distributional consequences of stabilization policies in developing countries. There is no systematic empirical evidence on the subject, and information can only be pieced together from isolated case studies, with the usual problems of comparability involved. One is thus reduced to a fairly abstract discussion about the likely impact that the policies listed above can have on the distribution of income, given what is known about the latter.
There is evidence on increases in absolute poverty on the one hand and on stabilization efforts on the other in the same country and during the same period, but the difficulty is to link these two elements.
First of all, empirical problems stand in the way. There is hardly any time-series information about the size distribution of income across households, especially in the poorer developing countries. India, the Philippines, and a few other countries have some survey data, but this is not generally true for developing countries as a whole, for the simple reason that such survey data are expensive and difficult to collect and are politically very sensitive.
Second, seemingly insurmountable analytical problems exist. Although inferences can be made from an analysis of a concrete situation, it is extremely difficult to determine the causality of events. Analytically sophisticated applied models, such as the fairly recent computable general equilibrium (CGE) models for developing countries, are a promising beginning. Simulation experiments with these models (which have all been constructed for middle-income countries such as Korea, Turkey, Thailand, Egypt, Cameroon, the Philippines, and Colombia-not for low-income countries) have established some important facts. Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson wrote, "There are certainly significant changes in the relative distribution among socio-economic groups, with some groups gaining in absolute terms in spite of an overall decline in real income as a result of the external shock" [17] . It is difficult to generalize conclusions across countries (or groups of countries), however, because "differences in economic environment alone suffice to make different groups gain or lose, even with the same adjustment policy. Different adjustment policies also have quite different effects on the distribution" [17] .
On the other hand, the distribution of income is precisely the weakest link in those CGE models, which seem too mechanical to depict the complexities of the situation involved. Using such a model, Adelman and Robinson [18] found in the case of Korea that the distribution of factor income is very sensitive to policy changes, but that the size distribution is remarkably stable with respect to those same policy changes. It is difficult to explain this puzzle in the framework of the model itself, because it does not consider dimensions that are important in poor countries, such as the variance of income within the same category of households, the unequal distribution of assets, etc.
The same group of households can lose in real terms from the point of view of the factor distribution (e.g., a real wage decline for farm workers' families), but will probably try to compensate this loss by seeking additional employment for women or children, by diversifying its activities (e.g., agriculturalists being at the same time artisans) in order to hedge against risks of real income losses, or by selling off assets.
In the absence of conclusive evidence, the short-term effect of stabilization policies on absolute poverty can be analysed only on a case-by-case basis, with knowledge of a few important stylized facts about developing countries.
In the remainder of this paper, we address implications for the poor of short-run stabilization measures. By shortrun measures, we mean the traditional components of stabilization, which are (a) fiscal stabilization, (b) monetary stabilization, and (c) exchange depreciation, thus excluding liberalization attempts that increasingly accompany traditional stabilization packages. Financial liberalization, trade liberalization, and other "new orthodox'' [16] or ''neo-conservative" [19] policies are sets of microeconomic adjustment measures that have the long-term objective of improving the efficiency of the economic system and of moving the economy in a laissez-faire direction.
The reason for not discussing such policies at length is simply that their success depends very much on the particular structure and historical background of individual countries, and it is hard to generalize. "The case for microeconomic adjustment has to be made for each country based on the details of its own particular distortions and on an analysis of the likely consequences of change. The general argument for liberalization will not, and should not, be sufficient to persuade responsible policymakers to move in that direction without judging the consequences" [20] . The experience with such measures is, at best, mixed, and in most cases microeconomic adjustments impose heavy short-term costs. The experience with financial and trade liberalization in southern-cone countries (Chile 1974 , Argentina 1976 -1982 , and Uruguay 1974 has been unfavourable and has had disastrous economic and social consequences [19, 21, 22] .
LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF SHORT-RUN STABILIZATION MEASURES
There are reasons to believe that traditional short-term stabilization will (a) increase income inequalities and (b) affect absolute poverty, measured by some appropriate indicator, such as calorie consumption per capita or weight-per-height in children.
First, we need to be aware of some stylized facts about developing countries that modify the environment in which those traditionally North Atlantic policies are applied and that will necessarily have an effect on the nature of the trade-offs involved. Developing countries are characterized by (a) low levels of per capita income and (b) high inequalities in the distribution of income. When issues of poverty are considered, it is clear that the most vulnerable groups will be found in low-income countries, such as the sub-Saharan African ones, and in those groups that are at the bottom of the distribution of income, such as unskilled workers, landless peasants, urban pedlars, etc. Within those groups, women and children are likely to be the most affected [23, 24] . Since these groups are the most vulnerable, if only be cause of their low level of income, any loss of income resulting from stabilization policies will affect them disproportionately.
On the other hand, most developing nations are characterized by the existence of a large informal sector in urban areas and by economic factors that operate outside the traditional, monetized economy. This is particularly true of the smallholder farm sector. This subsistence sector can be quite large in poor countries. Its existence complicates the analysis of the way adjustments operate precisely because they respond to changes in real income in a "perverse" manner (meaning any behaviour that does not conform to textbook economics!).
The issue of "supply response" is crucial in this respect. Decisions to enter the labour market for given skills are not necessarily made in response to marginal increases in the real wage, and decisions to market additional quantities of crops or livestock do not necessarily respond to higher prices, as the orthodoxy assumes. Not only should the usual behavioural assumptions be modified to analyse such situations; there might also be microeconomic constraints, in addition to macroeconomic ones such as foreign-exchange shortages, that limit the response of those groups in the context of a market economy. The most important determinants of changes in distribution resulting from short-term policies are as follows [25] :
• institutional factors, such as the existence of trade unions, lobbies, etc., the relative political power of specific groups that enables them to protect themselves against income losses, and mechanisms such as wage indexing; • shares of factors (different labour skills, capital, land) in different sectors of the economy, in particular in tradable (export-and import-substituting) versus non-tradable industries; • elasticities of substitution, and mobility of those factors across sectors; • consumption variables, which will have an influence on the equilibrium levels of output and employment by sector; • occurrence across groups of marginal reductions in government spending and marginal increases in taxation; • other features of the economy, such as the relative size of the "modern" sector vis-a-vis the traditional sector (market economy versus subsistence economy), of agriculture vis-a-vis other sectors, etc. On the basis of these variables -and before examining stabilization policies one by one and indicating to what adjustments in the economy they are likely to lead -we can anticipate the most important conclusions concerning the likely implications of such policies in the welfare of the poor in the short run: 1. Stabilization policies are expenditure-reducing in the short run; that is, their goal is to make total absorption fall. The burden of the reduction will affect various groups differently. The poor will be affected through the channel of wages and employment, to the extent that real wages and employment fall. The impact on the poor of expenditure-reducing measures will depend on their share of wage income in total income, and on their share of formal employment in total employment (see 5 below). 2. Stabilization policies are also expenditures witching in the short run; that is, their goal is to change the composition of expenditures through changes in relative prices. The poor will be affected by those price changes to the extent that the share of tradable goods and services in the price index used to deflate income is high. Expenditure-reducing and expenditure-switching policies affect the poor both through production (employment and wages) and consumption channels and through changes in relative prices and relative quantities. 3. These distributional effects may be accentuated if, as structuralists claim, the effects of orthodox policies are mainly stagflationary, even though they restore external balance. The compound impact of recession and inflation, added to the direct effects indicated under 1 and 2, cannot be predicted easily. 4. These effects on the poor may be dampened if cuts in government spending affect current expenditures less than proportionately and if the incidence of marginal reductions in government spending is low for the poor. 5. These effects also depend on the relative participation of the poor in the formal sector vis-a-vis the informal sector. The "formal" sector of the economy is characterized by high barriers to entry due to size, investment requirements and technology (capital: labor ratio), management style, predominance of wage employment, and size of establishment. The "informal" sector, by contrast, is characterized by virtually free entry, minimal capital and skill requirements, small size, and the prevalence of self-employment, for instance, in petty trade, small shops, etc. If the formal and informal sectors are good substitutes in production and in consumption, so that the informal sector could benefit from a recession in the formal sector, the poor will be less affected. If the two sectors are complementary-for example, in heavy industry-the poor in the formal sector will be affected indirectly to the extent that their inputs originate in the formal sector. 6. The net impact of stabilization policies on the poor in the short run will depend on (a) the direct and indirect effects of these policies, (b) compensatory mechanisms, such as those already mentioned, which can dampen these direct and indirect effects, and (c) the composition of the particular policy package. Raising the nominal wage during a devaluation will soften the blow for wage-earners, for instance. Conversely, some combination of policies, such as a devaluation together with severe fiscal and monetary measures, can lead to "overkill. "
STABILIZATION MECHANISMS

Devaluation of the Exchange Rate
Devaluation (an increase in the nominal price of the dollar in terms of the domestic currency) is often part of a stabilization package because it alters the real exchange rate. The latter is defined as an index of prices of export goods and import substituting goods (together called "traded goods") relative to the price of goods produced domestically that are not traded internationally, such as services, construction, etc. Altering the real exchange rate by devaluation is a powerful instrument to restructure incentives in the domestic economy, that is, to increase the price of non-traded goods and lower the price of traded goods. Consider the typical case of a country with a trade deficit. Absorption (expenditures) exceeds income. The country is thus an importer of real resources. Without any change in the international terms of trade faced by the country (the relative price of exports compared to imports), the country can finance this trade deficit by a capital inflow, which is consistent with the maintenance of overall balance-of payments equilibrium. Production within the country will not change because prices have not changed, since, by assumption, the terms of trade are constant; and so the situation would be sustainable only if the inflow of capital were permanent.
This conclusion is true only if the assumptions hold. If, for example, the terms of trade facing the country change when the country develops a trade deficit, the conclusion is not valid. Such cases are frequent in middle-income developing countries. If the trade deficit is due to low exports With comparatively high imports, from the point of view of absorption), it is clear that the international price of exports will slowly increase under the pressure of international demand (unless, of course, there is a world-wide recession so that there is a lack of demand in industrialized economies for minerals, agricultural goods, and other primary inputs produced by developing countries). When the country has the ability to influence international prices (as Brazil has for coffee, Thailand for rice, Madagascar for vanilla, the Philippines for coconuts, Bolivia for tin, Chile for copper, etc.), this simple conclusion ceases to be true. What then matters is the extent to which a fall in the price of exports will lead to an increased volume of exports for the developing country. Brazil, for example, managed to generate a huge trade surplus in 1985 because of favourable conditions in the world coffee market. Most countries, however, are small from the point of view of international trade. The vast majority of sub-Saharan African countries, for instance, have no influence on the international price of the commodities they export.
If some goods and/or services produced in the economy are non-traded, it is not true that a capital inflow will not change relative prices and, therefore, production. All countries produce exports, import-substituting goods (domestically produced goods that compete with imports), and non-traded goods. If we lump exports and import-substitutes together in a ''traded" category (which is legitimate as long as we maintain the assumption that the terms of trade between them, i.e., the relative price of exports in terms of import-substitutes, are constant) and analyse the trade deficit in terms of traded and nontraded goods, we will see easily why the real exchange rate is such an important variable.
A trade deficit implies that the absorption of traded goods exceeds their production. In terms of non-traded goods, however, production is always equal to absorption for the simple reason that one cannot import haircuts. The important implication of this fact is that in order to reduce the trade deficit permanently, it is necessary for the relative price of non-traded goods to fall. This will have two effects. Producers will shift their production toward traded goods because their price, in relative terms, has increased. Production of export goods that are also consumed domestically, such as beef in Argentina or Uruguay, or import-substitutes, such as television sets or automobiles in Brazil, will increase, thus increasing incomes. Simultaneously, consumers will shift to nontraded goods (e.g., cassava in Africa) and away from traded goods (e.g., imported rice or maize) because the price of non-traded goods, relatively speaking, has decreased, and this will reduce expenditures. Because of the nominal devaluation, exports will be boosted and imports of foreign goods will fall, reinforcing the process. Combined, these effects will be enough to absorb the excess supply of traded goods that were imported and bring the trade balance back to equilibrium.
The nominal increase in the exchange rate (devaluation) leads to an increase in the real exchange rate through an increase in the price of traded goods, a decrease in the price of non-traded goods, or both. This leads to drastic changes in the patterns of consumption and production, which restore equilibrium in the trade balance. The devaluation will affect the poor through three main channels: (a) wage and employment effects, (b) price effects, and (c) possible stagflationary effects.
Even if the money wage stays fixed during devaluation, the real wage will almost certainly decline. It declines first of all because the price of intermediate imports rises, thus squeezing domestic value added, and also because, there is a presumption, non-tradables are highly labourintensive. It will almost certainly decline in terms of the prices of tradables 126]. By how much is an empirical question, the answer to which depends on the weight of traded goods in the price index.
The switch from non-tradables to tradables is achieved through adjustments caused by internal price movements and without foreign capital flow. Very often, as pointed out by Helleiner [23] , this restructuring is little more than a euphemism for reducing wages and employment in the government and in other (formal) service sectors relative to other sectors. Adjustments of a permanent nature (lower levels of expenditures compatible with incomes generated in the economy) have been provoked by the devaluation, with the real exchange rate (the relative price of tradables vis-á-vis non-tradables) acting as the adjusting variable in the macro-economy.
In reality, there are many marginal cases where the same good can be classified as traded or non-traded. These marginal cases, however, can be crucial for the effect of the devaluation on the poor, depending on their "participation, " in production and in consumption in both types of sectors.
Some goods or services are non-traded by nature [27] , others because transportation costs would be too high to make international trade worthwhile, such as some services in the construction sector. Other goods are traded or non-traded depending on shifts in relative prices that can be induced by policy. At prevailing prices, if the good is taxed with a very high tariff, it can be considered nontraded, but it would be traded if there were no policy intervention. The purpose of liberalizing foreign trade is precisely to remove those barriers. Cassava is traded internationally by some countries, Thailand for example, and considered non-traded in some others. The ultimate criterion is that the good is considered to be traded if the fluctuations in its domestic price over time are closely correlated with the fluctuations in its international price, and that it is considered non-traded if domestic and international fluctuations are uncorrelated. This requires a good deal of information that is not always available in poor countries. In practice, since it is not possible to make a list of what goods are traded or not, the movements in the real exchange rate are measured by the behaviour of the exchange rate relative to internal price developments adjusted for price changes in major trading partners [28] .
Orthodox economists and the IMP claim that devaluation is a necessary measure of "austerity" and that it will have positive effects on the economy through a "restructuring of incentives. " They claim that shortrun costs implied in terms of income and employment are unavoidable and will be compensated by long-run gains. The country lives "beyond its means" and needs to find a more permanent position of equilibrium in order to grow in a balanced way, according to its comparative advantages in the international economy, without distortions.
To a certain extent, they have a point. When there are indications that the currency of a developing country is excessively overvalued, this indicates that "something is wrong" in the economy. Ghana, for example, devalued its currency in 1984 by 1,000 per cent, from 3.45 cedi per US dollar to 35.3. There were indications, however, that the currency was still overvalued, as indicated by a black market exchange rate of C135 per dollar in 1984. Therefore, in January 1986 the Ghanaian government announced a major devaluation of its currency by onethird of its nominal value, from C60 to C90 to the dollar, to restructure its economy. Simultaneously, it raised the minimum daily wage by 30 per cent. Production of traded goods such as export crops is often discriminated against, so that farmers and manufacturers have little incentive to invest resources in these sectors, and consumption of traded goods increases relative to non-traded goods, leading to a rising import bill and to a trade deficit that is, in the long run, unsustainable. In those cases, a rise in the real exchange rate becomes unavoidable.
Both theory and recent experience indicate that devaluation might not be the best instrument to achieve the goals of restoring external balance and restructuring incentives. First of all, devaluation is a highly sensitive political issue in some countries and can trigger unanticipated reactions. Second, whether the measure will be successful or not depends on a host of conditions. A wide body of theoretical and empirical literature deals with the conditions under which this will be the case. Unfortunately, the conclusions are not very encouraging for developing countries. The consensus is that a devaluation usually succeeds in restoring external balance, but has positive effects internally only under specific conditions that do not usually exist in poor countries. If exports do not increase and intermediate imports necessary for their production cannot decrease, there is a possibility of recession and inflation-reinforcing the effects mentioned above -first pointed out by orthodox critics [29, 30] . Coupled with a devaluation, fiscal and monetary restraining measures can lead to overkill and aggravate the stagflationary impact, with severe consequences for the poor.
Fiscal Restraint
Stabilization policies, because they are primarily concerned with reducing absorption, almost always involve fiscal restraint, achieved by cutting budgetary expenditures or by increasing government revenues. Beveridge and Kelly [31] provide detailed information on the fiscal content of 105 stand-by agreements negotiated in the decade 1969-1978. The majority of these programmes include tax measures to be taken before the start of the programme, efforts to strengthen tax administration, statements on total expenditures, and the contribution of public enterprises. There are also specific statements concerning the reduction of wages of public-sector employees, the reduction of consumer subsidies and transfers to public enterprises, and public pricing policies. In 40 per cent of these programmes the overall budget deficit is made an object of attack, and the ratio of the deficit to the GDP is to be reduced by more than 1 per cent from the level of the previous year. In many cases, these fiscal targets are set too low and have to be revised.
They were revised upward, for instance, in Argentina from 5 to 8.1 per cent of the GDP in 1984, in Brazil from -0.6 to 0.3 per cent also in 1984, and in Mexico from 3.5 to 5.1 per cent in 1985. In spite of these corrections, the projections made by IMP economists were off target, since the actual deficit reached 12.4 per cent in Argentina but -0.2 per cent in Brazil in 1984 [32] .
The short-term effect of such fiscal measures on the poor will depend, in the first instance, on whether the government's cutbacks affect current expenditures or investment expenditures. In the former category, the likely candidates are social programmes and employment and wages in the public sector. Helleiner wrote that "the Latin American experience of the past decade, and particularly of the last five years, offers plenty of scope for careful testing of the popular proposition that, whatever the composition of expenditures when they are rising, cutbacks typically impact disproportionately upon social programmes and the poorest" [3] .
During the external shock period of 1973-1975 the adjustment process involved mostly cuts in public consumption, but during the second major wave of shocks, in 1979-1983, investment cutbacks accounted for proportionately a much larger share of the aggregate cutbacks than in 1973-1975 13] . These cuts in public investment programmes were made necessary by the political limits to further reduction in consumption. Even then, Mexico cut current expenditures from 38 per cent of GDP in 1982 to 30 per cent in 1984.
In many Latin countries, interest payments on the external debt rose dramatically, thus making it difficult to reduce current expenditures. After 1982, the IDB reports that almost all Latin American countries showed a decline in the ratio of public capital expenditures to GDP, and that, within that category, social infrastructure suffered most [32] .
Peltzman noted that government spending on subsidies and transfers has grown faster than other elements of public expenditures [33] . He argued that a decline in income inequality in developed countries and the emergence of a politically articulate middle class have accounted for major growth in government in the past 50 years. More equality has generated a political demand for still more equalization and, hence, a growing demand for subsidy and transfer programmes. He concluded that "there is nothing inexorable about the growth of government, nor is there some arbitrary limiting ratio of government to GNP. Instead, our argument is that the size of government responds to the articulated interests of those who stand to gain or lose from politicization of the allocation of resources. "
Although there may be deliberate exceptions, however, the presumption is that government expenditures are more equitably distributed than private ones [3] . Exceptions can be found, for instance, in societies that discriminate deliberately in government programmes against certain races, ethnic groups, or religious groups. The first example that comes to mind is South Africa, but countries such as Malaysia have similar economic policies [29, 30] .
Public-sector cutbacks are therefore more likely to harm the poor than are private expenditure cutbacks of equal size. Another corollary is that the poor will stand to lose from public spending restrictions to the extent that they are not able to articulate their demands politically.
IMPACT OF THE REMOVAL OF FOOD SUBSIDIES
Recently, orthodox policies have involved removing or reducing subsidies on consumer goods-for fiscal as well as other reasons, such as the removal of distortions affecting productivity in the food-crop sector. The official IMP historiographer writes that "by 1978 additional performance criteria [to the usual conditionality] were occasionally used. For example, in some programmes the elimination of subsidies for basic food items was included. Not only was this considered helpful in cutting budgetary expenditures but, by permitting high prices for foodgrains, it was considered a price incentive for farmers to increase production" [10] . We consider the likely impact of such policies under the heading of fiscal restraint, although it is clear that they have broader motives and implications.
Governments almost always intervene in food markets by introducing a wedge between producer prices, import prices, and consumer prices. The goals are to stabilize prices and thus reduce income fluctuations, and to avoid inflation. In poor countries, food constitutes a high share of total production and consumption, and interventions in food markets attempt to maintain or at most marginally alter the status quo between the interest groups involved.
In general, cuts in food subsidies will favourably affect the income of farms that produce food and negatively affect the income of urban workers and rural landless. But the end result of the cut depends on how it will affect the general level of activity, that is, how those changes in nominal income affect demand for nonagricultural goods, prices, and real income. If demand for nonagricultural products is dominated by rural income, the subsidy cut can have a positive effect. Otherwise, there will be an output loss-and possibly inflation due to excess demand-in the nonagricultural sectors, and the overall impact can be contractionary [15] .
In Egypt the food subsidy system significantly redistributes income towards the urban and the rural poor [36] , and abolishing the system would hurt them. In Thailand, by contrast, increasing the price of rice would have only minimal effects on rural poverty because most of the gains would be realized by large commercial farmers, while the short-run losses would be incurred mostly by the urban poor [37] . In Sri Lanka the change in the rice subsidy system in 1978-1979 had a negative impact on nutrition among the poor [38, 39] . All these changes for attempted changes) were motivated by fiscal reductions.
Cuts in food subsidies lead to an immediate decline in the demand for food products. This induces a decline in food imports and leads to an improvement in the trade balance, which is usually the overriding objective of the policy. Under the 1985-1986 stand-by agreement with Madagascar, for example, imports of rice were required to fall from an all-time high of 350,000 tons in 1982 to 80,000 tons in 1985. At the same time, rice prices were liberalized by the government in 1983, and this led to an average threefold increase in the price of rice in 1985. Food price increases after subsidy cuts or price liberalization are likely to be high because the demand for basic food items is price inelastic. Moreover, the poor devote a large share of their spending (usually 50 to 60 per cent) to food. Subsidy cuts are supposed to lead to substitution in consumption from imported to domestic foodstuffs, and from traded goods such as rice to nontraded goods such as cassava.
Tight Monetary Policy
The dominant view of monetarists is that the most common cause of disequilibrium in developing countries is an overly expansionary domestic demand policy, and therefore calls for '' demand management" policies, usually in the form of credit restrictions. Other situations are characterized by distortions in costs or relative prices requiring a devaluation of the exchange rate, elimination of consumer subsidies and/or of restrictions on trade, and international payments, which also make it necessary to apply a tight monetary policy, since "an inappropriate expansion of credit could nullify the intended changes in relative prices and their effects on the allocation of resources" [40] .
The basic assumption of the monetarist model [41] is that there is a stable relationship between financial variables such as money and domestic credit) and nonfinancial variables (such as real national income and prices), and that the monetary authorities can control some of the financial variables so as to affect the real side of the economy [7] .
Financial programming, therefore, starts with the "equation of exchange" of the quantity theory of money, which states that the value of transactions in the economy (prices times quantities) in a given period is equal to the amount of money demanded multiplied by some proportionality factor. This factor is equal to the inverse of the "velocity" of money, which measures the speed at which money is utilized in financing transactions.
If we assume, as monetarists do, (1) that velocity is constant and (2) that the growth rate of output is known from supply (or employment) projections done by the IMP staff, the increase in money demand will depend only on price increases. It is assumed that increases in the price level will be determined in the short run by rises in the costs of labour and of intermediate imported inputs, that is, by the levels of the wage and exchange rate.
On the other hand, the basic accounting identity of the consolidated banking system states that money supply (liabilities in the balance sheet, made of currency of the central bank and deposits at commercial banks) must be balanced by assets. These assets are either loans to the private and public sectors or foreign-reserve holdings. Thus, it is easy to see what could happen if credit is restricted.
Since money demand must equal money supply, restricting the latter in the form of credit ceilings or reductions in the fiscal deficit will put pressure on the price index -from the equation of exchange.
Here an additional monetarist postulate must be introduced, called the "law of one price. " It states that the price of traded goods in the country is equal to the world market price times the (effective) exchange rate. The domestic price of the traded good "cannot" exceed its international equivalent, due account being taken of transportation costs and other surcharges. If it did exceed it, say in the case of importables, every customer would buy the foreign substitute.
If there is pressure on the price index to fall but the law of one price applies so that prices of traded goods stay constant, then prices of nontraded goods will decline. There will be expenditure switching. The change in relative prices means that it becomes more profitable to produce more traded good -export more or substitute imports. The surplus of exports over imports will increase, and the trade deficit will be smaller.
If the law of one price does not apply, prices will be determined by international costs and money demand will be given by the equation of exchange. The change in money supply is set equal to the change in money demand. Since money supply is made of bank loans and international reserves, cutting back loans by the banking sector must lead to an increase in reserves. Reserves come from net exports (exports minus imports) plus net capital inflows. If the amount of capital inflow (foreign grants and loans, etc.) is given, an increase in reserves can only lead to an increasing trade surplus -or decreasing trade deficit.
In both cases, whether the law of one price applies or not, the goal of redressing the balance of trade deficit (increasing the amount of foreign reserves) is achieved. No consideration is given to the fact that the policy could be strongly deflationary, with all the social consequences attached to deflation. In the monetarist reasoning, causality runs from money to prices and not the other way around.
The adjustment process can of course fail if the IMP economists do not do their homework properly, that is, if they make incorrect projections of output growth, etc., or if they have been given inaccurate data by local policy-makers during their dialogue to set performance criteria, as sometimes happens. As indicated by Taylor [42] and Helleiner [43] , this is frequently the case with African countries, which have not received the level of competence that they deserve from the IMP.
The process can also fail because the assumptions of the model used for financial programming are farfetched. Output is not strictly determined by supply, velocity is certainly not constant but jumps erratically, the law of one price does not apply or the price index used for the calculations is not the relevant one, etc. The model is too simple. There are too many intervening variables that are simply treated as fixed.
Businesspersons usually dislike "tight money" because it drives interest rates up. In developing countries, most loans to the business sector are made to finance working capital, to pay for imported inputs, or to pay the wage bill, and much less to finance investment. The rise in interest rates will therefore increase costs. The normal response of the businessperson will be to attempt to pass along the increase in the form of higher prices or to cut back on activity. The outcome is that, even if aggregate demand fails because of credit restrictions-which is the purported goal of the policy -aggregate supply can fall even more. There will be an increase in excess demand for goods and services, and this will fuel inflation rather than restrain it. If the "cost-push effect" of tight credit policy is strong enough, the result in the short run is stagflation: inflation and output contraction.
As can be seen, simple causality does not necessarily mean lower prices. But the goal is still achieved: less money improves the trade balance because output contraction reduces demand for intermediate imports [15] .
The effects of ''tight money'' and credit restrictions and of "ceilings" on poverty are particularly difficult to analyse. Monetary restraint will affect various groups differently, and especially those who are dependent on credit for their day-to-day operations such as small farmers, small entrepreneurs, etc. It will also affect the poor through its possible inflationary and recessionary impact.
